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INTRODUCTION 
Appellants M. Dalton Cannon and Patricia Cannon (the 
"Cannons") were struck by a vehicle at 6:58 p.m. on February 1, 
1990, while using a pedestrian crosswalk en route to a 
University of Utah basketball game. The Cannons, who were in 
their late sixties when the accident occurred, were critically 
injured, and are permanently disabled as a result of the 
accident. 
The crosswalk where the accident occurred is located 
on South Campus Drive immediately south of the Huntsman Center. 
Two University of Utah police officers had been specifically 
assigned that evening to assist pedestrians across the crosswalk 
and to control traffic there. However, at the time of the 
accident, the officers had chosen to get out of the bad weather 
that evening, and were sitting in their car at the crosswalk 
talking. They were not taking a formal break from their duties, 
but rather were simply trying to perform their duties from the 
car. Both officers subsequently admitted that in order to 
perform their duties properly, they needed to have been out of 
their car, actively managing pedestrian and vehicular flow at 
the crosswalk. The Cannons contend inter alia in this action 
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that the officers' negligent failure to perform their assigned 
tasks was a proximate cause of the accident that befell them. 
The Third District Court, Hon. Richard Moffat 
presiding, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
University of Utah (the "University") on the basis that the 
University officers owed no duty of care to the Cannons. This 
ruling was based upon the "public duty" doctrine, as enunciated 
in Ferree v. State. 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989). The Court 
initially held that the officers had only a general duty to 
ensure public safety. Relying on Ferree, the Court found that 
this general duty to the public was insufficient to create a 
special duty of care in favor of the Cannons. The Court also 
rejected the Cannons' claim that the University owed them a duty 
of care as business invitees, and struck two affidavits filed by 
the Cannons in opposition to the University' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The University Fails to Distinguish Between The 
University's Obligation to Control Traffic In the 
First Place and Its Obligation to Do So Competently 
Once the Task Was Undertaken. 
A. The Public Duty Rule Is Inapplicable Here. 
The University has argued at length concerning the 
nature of the public duty rule. The Cannons have little quarrel 
-2-
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with the rule itself -- where a public entity owes a duty only 
to the public at large, a negligence claim cannot be predicated 
on the breach of that public duty alone. Ferree v. State, 784 
P. 2d 149 (Utah 1989). Applied to this case, the rule might 
arguably relieve the University from responsibility for 
providing traffic control at the crosswalks in the first 
place. l However, the University fails to make a crucial 
distinction here. The issue in this case is not whether traffic 
control should have been provided in the first place. It is 
whether, once the University affirmatively undertook to station 
police officers at the crosswalks, those officers had a duty to 
act non-negligently. In this situation, the public duty 
doctrine simply does not apply. 
All of the cases cited by the University are 
distinguishable for this reason. In the case most heavily 
relied upon by the University, State v. Flaniaan. 489 N. E. 2d 
1216 (Ind. App. 1989), the plaintiffs were hit by a car while 
1
 The Cannons contend that the University owed them a duty 
of care as business invitees independently of any other duty of 
care. University basketball games are highly promoted, revenue 
producing events. The University obviously was aware of the 
danger posed by high volumes of pedestrian traffic crossing busy 
campus streets, based upon its assignment of police to the 
crosswalks. In this situation, the University had a duty to take 
reasonable measures to protect its invitees while on campus. 
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walking along a highway. There was no allegation that the 
police were anywhere in the area when the accident occurred. 
The plaintiffs nonetheless sued the State of Indiana, claiming 
that it had an obligation to provide safe pedestrian access in 
the area. Thus, the issue in Flaniaan was whether Indiana had a 
duty to provide traffic control in the first place, not whether 
it had performed a voluntarily assumed duty competently. 
The other cases cited by the University are similarly 
distinguishable. In Obrav v. Malmberq, 484 P. 2d 160, 162 (Utah 
1971) and Christensen v. Havward. 694 P. 2d 612 (Utah 1984), the 
plaintiffs' claims were based upon the defendant sheriffs' 
general responsibilities to provide crime control. Neither case 
involved the issue of whether a specifically assumed task had 
been performed in a non-negligent manner. 
This distinction is also clear in Ferree, supra. In 
Ferree, a prison inmate on a weekend furlough got drunk at a 
wedding and later killed a stranger. The Supreme Court held 
that the Department of Corrections' general duty to protect the 
public did not create a duty of care in favor of unforeseeable 
potential plaintiffs who might somehow be harmed by a released 
prisoner. 
-4-
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The University contends that the officers were only 
engaged in pursuing their general duty of traffic control, and 
that they had no duty to come to the assistance of anyone in 
particular. University Brief at 9. This assertion is factually 
untrue. The officers were specifically assigned by the 
University to assist pedestrians at the crosswalk where the 
Cannons were injured. R. 327/ 329. One of the officers 
acknowledged that their assignment required them to stop traffic 
until pedestrians made it across the crosswalk. R. 327. The 
investigating officer similarly stated that it was the officers' 
specific duty to make contact with pedestrians at the edge of 
the crosswalk, and to advise them when to cross. R. 329. 
Officers Purvis and Beglarian instead chose to return to their 
car and get out of the rain. In short, they attempted to 
perform their duties from the car, rather than getting wet and 
remaining available to assist pedestrians. 
Where, as here, a public entity has assumed a specific 
task, such as providing traffic control, it must do so non-
negligently. Florence v. Goldberg. 375 N. E. 2d 763 (N. Y. App. 
1978); Alhambra School Dist. v. Superior Court. 796 P. 2d 470, 
474 (Ariz. 1990). The public duty rule is irrelevant here, 
because the University specifically assumed responsibility for 
-5-
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assisting pedestrians at the crosswalks. A duty of care 
therefore existed in favor of those pedestrians. 
B. Where A Specific Class of Victims Exists, A Duty of 
Care Arises. 
The University argues that a public entity cannot be 
held liable in the absence of a particular duty to a specific 
individual. University Brief at 7. This is not the law in 
Utah. In order for a special relationship sufficient to support 
a duty of care to exist, a plaintiff need merely be a part of a 
reasonably identifiable group. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P. 2d 
1156, 1162 (Utah 1991). Where there is a foreseeable risk of 
harm to such an identifiable group from a government entities' 
failure to exercise reasonable care, the government entity owes 
that group a duty of care to act non-negligently. 1^. Here, the 
University recognized the danger that pre-game traffic would 
pose to a specific group - pedestrians using the South Campus 
Drive crosswalks prior to basketball games. It chose to remedy 
this danger by assigning officers to assist pedestrians there. 
Similarly, the officers recognized the danger of the crosswalks, 
and the need to actively assist pedestrians. Injury to a 
specific group was clearly foreseeable as a result of their 
-6-
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failure to do so. Under Rollins, a duty of care is present 
here. 
II. The Restatement (2&) of Torts Supports the Existence 
of A Duty of Care In this Case. 
The University relies upon Sections 314 through 320 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support of its claims that 
no duty of care exists. As with the case law cited by the 
University, this reliance is misplaced. Section 314A of the 
Restatement lists certain situations where a special 
relationship creating a duty of care is deemed to exist: common 
carriers and their passengers; innkeepers and guests; possessors 
of land and their invitees; and custodians and their wards. The 
University insists that this list is the exclusive list of 
relationships that give rise to a duty of care. University 
Brief at 11. In fact, a caveat to Restatement (2d) § 314A 
expressly states that this list is not intended to be exclusive, 
and the Utah Supreme Court has recognized other such 
relationships. See DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. , 663 P. 2d 433 
(Utah 1983). 
The University additionally neglects to mention a more 
directly applicable provision of the Restatement (2d) of Torts. 
The Restatement (2d) also recognizes the distinction between a 
-7-
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duty to act in the first place, and the obligation to act non-
negligently once services are undertaken. Section 323 of the 
Restatement (2d) provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to renter services to Another Wfticfr he gfrPVlfl 
recognize as necessary for the protection of the 
other's person . .. is subject to liability to the 
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to 
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, 
if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other' s 
reliance upon the undertaking. 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, the University undertook to provide 
police protection to pedestrians utilizing the South Campus 
Drive crosswalks prior to University basketball games. The 
officers knew the area was dangerous at times such as this; 
Officer Beglarian testified: "Yes. I've driven down South 
Campus Drive during a game — or prior and not been assigned 
traffic control, and it' s -- it' s really bad. But I personally 
go very slow. " Beglarian Deposition at 52, 1. 22-24. On the 
night in question, the visibility of pedestrians and vehicular 
traffic was made worse by the inclement conditions then 
prevailing. Under these circumstances it was critical to the 
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safety of the Cannons and other pedestrians that the officers 
remained vigilant and performed their duties properly. 
To fulfil their assignment adequately, the officers 
needed to meet pedestrians in the crosswalk and either stop the 
pedestrians or stop oncoming traffic. They failed to do so 
here, instead remaining in their car while the Cannons were 
forced to navigate the crosswalk without assistance. The 
officers failure to perform their assignment in a clearly 
dangerous situation obviously increased the risk that a vehicle-
pedestrian accident would occur. Restatement (2d) § 323 
supports a ruling that the University owed a duty of care to 
pedestrians using police-operated crosswalks prior to University 
basketball games. 
III. Multiple Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment In 
Favor of the University. 
The trial court also erred in granting summary 
judgment because disputed factual issues exist here. Where 
underlying facts are in dispute, the application of the public 
duty rule and the existence of a duty of care become a question 
of fact. Estate of Tanasiievich v. City of Hammond, 383 N. E. 2d 
1081 (Ind. App. 1978). The Court of Appeals should note that 
the Cannons claim that the University officers were actively 
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negligent, by allowing marker flares to burn down,2 negligently 
parking their vehicle in a manner that obstructed drivers7 
views, and otherwise acting negligently. See Appellants' 
Principal Brief at 28. Even assuming arguendo that the public 
duty rule were applicable, the officers were required to refrain 
from increasing the risk to pedestrians. Their failure to do so 
precludes summary judgment in favor of the University. 
The University' s arguments concerning the public duty 
rule, and the trial court' s decision on this issue, also rely 
upon disputed facts. The trial court' s decision states that the 
officers were not engaged in traffic control at the time of the 
accident. The court reasoned that since the University might 
have no obligation under the public duty rule to provide traffic 
control in the first place, the officers total failure to 
perform their task excuses any liability. The University' s 
brief echoes this argument. 3 In fact, the officers were on 
2
 The trial court stated that there was "sufficient" 
evidence to conclude that the flares were burning, despite 
testimony of the driver and of Dr. Cannon that they saw no 
flares. Memorandum Decision at 3. This sort of weighing of the 
evidence is clearly inappropriate in the context of summary 
judgment. 
3
 The Universi^ : states that the officers were about to 
"resume" traffic control at the time of the accident. University 
Brief at 4. 
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active duty at the time of the accident, but were completely 
neglecting their duties. The trial court failed in its 
obligation to resolve all doubts concerning factual issue in 
favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Durham v. 
Maraetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The various factual 
misapprehensions by the trial court require reversal here. 
IV. The Issue of Reliance, Even if Relevant, Involves 
Disputed Issues of Fact. 
The University places major emphasis on one statement 
Dr. Cannon made in his deposition. Dr Cannon stated that, when 
he and his wife arrived at the crosswalk, they saw the police 
car, but no police officers. This was of course because the 
officers were inside their car talking and staying out of the 
weather, rather than performing their duties. Dr. Cannon states 
that because the Cannons saw no police to help them, they 
proceeded across the crosswalk. After passing immediately in 
front of the officers car, they stepped into the westbound lanes 
of South Campus Drive and were hit. 
The University argues that, because the Cannons saw 
that no officers would be assisting them, and proceeded to 
attempt to cross the street anyway, they did not rely on police 
assistance. The University argues that this alleged lack of 
-11-
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reliance means that no special relationship arose between them 
and the officers sufficient to support a duty of care. 
University Brief at 15. Initially, it is important to note that 
reliance is unnecessary as a matter of law for the creation of a 
duty of care in these circumstances. Section 323 of the 
Restatement (2d) of Torts provides that one who undertakes to 
provide services to another is subject to liability if his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, 
without reference to reliance by the plaintiff. In addition, it 
would be pernicious public policy to allow public officers to 
escape liability by completely failing to perform their assigned 
duties, and then claiming that the injured victim had not relied 
upon their presence. The fact that the Cannons were forced to 
attempt to cross South Campus Drive without assistance does not 
prevent a duty of care from arising. 
Even if proof of reliance were necessary, the issue is 
one of fact, and not appropriate for summary judgment. Dr. 
Cannon submitted an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment 
stating that one of the reasons he and Mrs. Cannon used the 
crosswalk was the typical availability of police traffic 
control. The trial court struck this affidavit as contradictory 
to his previous deposition testimony, in which he stated that 
-12-
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other parking sites on the University campus involved climbing 
many stairs. 4 As more fully set forth in the Cannons' 
principal brief, the affidavit and Dr. Cannon' s deposition 
testimony are simply not contradictory. Unless any 
inconsistency between deposition testimony and an affidavit is 
completely implausible -- which is not the case here -- an 
affidavit creating a question of fact should not be stricken. 
Gaw v. State bv and through UDOT, 798 P. 2d 1130, 1140-41 (Utah 
App. 1990). The issue of reliance, if relevant at all, is a 
factual issue, and one that should not have figured in a 
decision on summary judgment. 
V. The Cannons Were Business Invitees. 
The University argues that it is not responsible for 
taking reasonable actions to protect the safety of pedestrians 
on South Campus Drive before basketball games, because the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") holds title to South 
Campus Drive. It further argues that it has no duty of care 
towards those injured off the premises that it owns. The 
4
 The trial court also held that the affidavit was not filed 
timely, because it was filed on the day before the summary 
judgment hearing. Rule 6(d) U. R, C. P. permits affidavits to be 
filed the day before a summary judgment hearing. See Beaufort 
Concrete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co. , 352 F. 2d 460, 462 
(5th Cir. 1965)(interpreting identical federal rule). 
-13-
160X21953.1 
problem with the University' s argument is that it is possession 
of land, not ownership, that determines whether a duty of care 
is created. Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts 
provides that a possessor of land is subject to liability for 
the negligent acts of third parties where it has failed to 
exercise reasonable care to protect them from the harm. This 
section of the Restatement imposes an affirmative duty on 
possessors of land to exercise care in protecting the safety of 
invitees. 
The University should not be able to escape liability 
here simply because UDOT holds legal title to South Campus 
Drive. The University, not UDOT, advertises and encourages 
public attendance at University basketball games. The 
University, not UDOT, makes parking lots on the south side of 
South Campus Drive available to spectators who are en route to 
the Huntsman Center, directly across the street. Most 
importantly, the University, not UDOT, was physically in 
possession of South Campus Drive when the accident occurred. 
The Cannons claim is based upon the University' s failure to 
protect those it invited to the University campus. The 
University obviously recognized the dangers posed by the 
combination of heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic at the 
-14-
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crosswalks, because it, not UDOT, specifically assigned officers 
to assist pedestrians there. It is equitable that the 
University be required to exercise due care to protect invitees. 
CONCLUSION 
The University' s brief seeks to gloss over certain 
crucial facts that distinguish this case from typical "public 
duty" cases. The University obviously recognized the danger 
posed to its invitees by the crosswalks, because it specifically 
assigned officers to assist pedestrians there. Those officers 
recognized that, to prevent accidents, they had to be out of 
their car directing traffic and pedestrians. Unfortunately, the 
officers here neglected their assigned task, and the Cannons 
were injured as a result. This is not a case where the officers 
failed to perform only some generalized public duty. Instead, 
the officers negligently performed a specific assigned task in 
the face of a recognized danger to those they were assigned to 
protect. The officers owed a duty of care to the Canons. The 
trial court' s decision should be reversed, and this case 
remanded for trial. 
160X21953. 1 
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